Lecture 8: Market Structures1

How Substitutability Determines Market Power

Learning Objectives

  • Explain how substitutability determines market power
  • Describe the four main market structures: perfect competition, monopolistic competition, oligopoly, and monopoly
  • Analyze the efficiency of each market structure
  • Discuss the role of market power in pricing decisions
  • Evaluate the impact of market power on consumer welfare

Two Ways to Use Economics

Positive economics: what does happen (testable predictions)

Normative economics: what should happen (policy advice)

\(MR = MC\) works both ways:

Example
Normative “A firm should produce where \(MR = MC\) to maximize profit”
Positive “A new technology lowers \(MC\) at all quantities \(\Rightarrow\) the firm produces more \(\Rightarrow\) price falls”

The positive prediction maps directly to a supply shift: lower costs \(\rightarrow\) more output \(\rightarrow\) lower prices. Today we use both lenses.

Review: The Competitive Benchmark

In perfect competition, firms are price takers:

  • \(P = MC\) — price equals marginal cost
  • Zero economic profit in the long run
  • Allocatively efficient: every mutually beneficial trade occurs

This is our benchmark. Everything today is a deviation from it.

What Happens When Quantity Is Inefficient?

Figure 1: When quantity falls below the competitive equilibrium, surplus is destroyed

Why Does Quantity Fall Below Equilibrium?

Many forces can push \(Q\) below the efficient level:

Cause Mechanism
Market power Firm restricts output to raise price
Taxes Wedge between buyer and seller price
Price floors Minimum price above equilibrium (e.g. minimum wage)
Price ceilings Maximum price below equilibrium (e.g. rent control)
Externalities Private costs \(\neq\) social costs

Today’s focus: market power — firms deliberately restricting \(Q\) because they face downward-sloping demand.

Key Question

What gives a firm the power to charge \(P > MC\)?

The answer: how few substitutes exist for its product.

  • More substitutes \(\rightarrow\) more competition \(\rightarrow\) less pricing power
  • Fewer substitutes \(\rightarrow\) less competition \(\rightarrow\) more pricing power

Substitutes and Complements: Definitions

Substitutes: goods that can replace each other

  • If the price of Coke rises, demand for Pepsi increases
  • Cross-price effect is positive: \(\frac{\Delta Q_B}{\Delta P_A} > 0\)

Complements: goods used together

  • If the price of printers rises, demand for ink falls
  • Cross-price effect is negative: \(\frac{\Delta Q_B}{\Delta P_A} < 0\)

The Substitutability Spectrum

Figure 2: The substitutability spectrum determines market power

Why Substitutability Matters for Firms

The number and closeness of substitutes determines:

  1. Demand elasticity — more substitutes \(\rightarrow\) more elastic demand
  2. Pricing power — elastic demand \(\rightarrow\) can’t raise price much
  3. Long-run profits — easy substitution \(\rightarrow\) entry erodes profits

\[|\varepsilon_d| \uparrow \quad \Rightarrow \quad \text{markup} \downarrow \quad \Rightarrow \quad P \rightarrow MC\]

Cross-Price Elasticity

Formally, the cross-price elasticity of demand:

\[\varepsilon_{AB} = \frac{\%\Delta Q_B}{\%\Delta P_A}\]

Sign Relationship Example
\(\varepsilon_{AB} > 0\) Substitutes Coke & Pepsi
\(\varepsilon_{AB} < 0\) Complements Printers & ink
\(\varepsilon_{AB} \approx 0\) Unrelated Pizza & lawnmowers

Perfect Competition: perfect substitutes, free entry

When products are perfect substitutes, no firm has pricing power:

  • Any firm that raises \(P\) above market price loses all customers
  • \(P = MC\) is the only sustainable outcome
  • Demand curve facing each firm is perfectly elastic (horizontal)
  • Short run: firms may earn profits or losses
  • Long run: profits attract entry:
    1. New firms enter (entry is easy because products are perfect substitutes)
    2. Supply increases \(\rightarrow\) price falls
    3. Continues until \(P = ATC\) \(\rightarrow\) zero economic profit

If your product is identical to everyone else’s, you’re a price taker. Entry erodes profits because perfect substitutability means new entrants are just as good as incumbents.

Market Structures: Overview

Feature Perfect Competition Monopolistic Comp. Oligopoly Monopoly
# of firms Many Many Few One
Product Identical Similar Differentiated Unique
Substitutability Perfect Close Partial None
Barriers to entry None Low High Very high
Pricing power None Some Moderate High
\(P\) vs \(MC\) \(P = MC\) \(P > MC\) \(P > MC\) \(P > MC\)

Recall: Perfect competition gives us Pareto efficiency per the first welfare theorem.

Case Study: Why Was Cable TV a Monopoly?

In the 1990s, most towns had exactly one cable provider. Why?

  • Huge fixed cost — laying cable infrastructure
  • Very low marginal cost per additional viewer
  • ATC falls over a large range \(\rightarrow\) one firm serves cheaply

If we allowed 5 companies to each lay their own cables, what would happen to costs? To prices?

How Does a Cable Monopolist Set Price?

You’re the only cable provider. How do you choose your price?

“Raise it!” — Okay, raise it until when?

Until \(MR = MC\).

But why not even higher?

  • Raising price \(\rightarrow\) some customers cancel
  • Revenue lost on those customers > revenue gained from higher price
  • Cost of providing to these customers increasing
  • That’s the elasticity logic: \(MR < MC\) means you’ve gone too far

Why is monopoly quantity smaller than competitive quantity? Don’t look ahead — reason it out.

Who Loses Under Cable Monopoly?

After the monopolist restricts output and charges \(P > MC\):

  • Does the monopolist lose? No — they earn profit.
  • Do consumers lose? Yes — higher price, fewer subscribers.
  • Does society lose? Yes — the deadweight loss.

Is the DWL transferred to someone?

No — it disappears. Trades that would create surplus simply don’t happen. That’s what makes it inefficiency, not just redistribution.

Streaming Enters: What Happens to Cable?

Netflix launches. What happens to cable’s demand curve?

  • Shifts left — some customers switch
  • Becomes more elastic — cable now has a substitute

Does cable still have market power?

Yes — but less. Cable and Netflix aren’t identical (live sports vs. on-demand). They’re imperfect substitutes.

We’ve moved from monopoly toward monopolistic competition.

Why Doesn’t Streaming Become Perfect Competition?

Today: Netflix, Hulu, Disney+, Prime, Apple TV+, Max, Peacock…

Why don’t prices fall to \(MC\)?

  • Each service has exclusive content (differentiation)
  • Switching costs (learning a new interface, watchlists)
  • Not perfect substitutes — Stranger Things is only on Netflix

Many firms + free entry + differentiated products = monopolistic competition

Each firm has some market power, but entry keeps driving profits toward zero.

In-Class Game: “The Restricted Seller”

Game Setup (~2 min)

Roles:

  • Buyers (half the class) — each gets a private WTP slip
  • Sellers (2–3 students) — marginal cost = $4 per unit
  • Everyone else observes

Buyer WTP values: $20, $18, $16, $14, $12, $10, $8, $6

Seller cost: $4 per unit (unlimited capacity)

Rules: one unit per buyer, announce trades publicly, record prices on the board.

Round 1: Competitive Market (~5 min)

All sellers can trade. Free bargaining.

Let it run. Record each trade on the board.

What should happen:

  • Prices cluster near \(P \approx 8\text{--}12\)
  • Almost all buyers with WTP \(> 4\) trade
  • ~6–7 trades

Quick sketch on the board: where is equilibrium? How much total surplus?

Round 2: Monopoly (~5 min)

Now: only ONE seller.

Before trading, ask the monopolist:

“How many units will you sell, and at what price?”

They must commit to a quantity and set one price.

Watch what happens:

  • Monopolist likely sells ~3–4 units at \(P \approx 14\text{--}16\)
  • Fewer trades than Round 1

Debrief: Who Lost?

Who was willing to pay more than $4 but didn’t get to buy?

Those are the unrealized trades.

  • Did the monopolist lose? No — they earned more profit.
  • Did those excluded buyers lose? Yes — they didn’t get to buy the good they wanted.
  • Did society lose? Yes — the deadweight loss.

Where did that lost value go?

It disappeared. That’s deadweight loss. You didn’t draw it — you just lived it.

From Game to Graph

Figure 3: The game you just played, drawn as supply and demand

Monopoly: No Close Substitutes

One firm, no close substitutes, high barriers

Sources of monopoly power:

  1. Legal barriers — patents, licenses, regulations
  2. Natural monopoly — economies of scale so large one firm serves market cheapest
  3. Network effects — value increases with users (e.g., social media platforms)
  4. Control of key resources — De Beers diamonds (historically)

A monopolist has market power because there is nothing else consumers can buy instead.

Monopoly: The Graph

Figure 4: The monopolist restricts output and charges P > MC, creating deadweight loss

Why Monopoly Is Inefficient

The monopolist produces where \(MR = MC\), but charges \(P > MC\):

  • Consumers who value the good between \(MC\) and \(P_m\) don’t get it
  • These are mutually beneficial trades that don’t happen
  • The lost surplus is the deadweight loss (DWL)

\[\text{DWL} = \frac{1}{2}(P_m - MC)(Q_c - Q_m)\]

Monopolistic Competition: Imperfect Near Substitutes

Key features:

  • Many firms, free entry and exit
  • Products are close but imperfect substitutes
  • Each firm has a tiny bit of market power

Examples: restaurants, coffee shops, clothing brands, craft breweries

Every restaurant is slightly different — that differentiation gives each one a small downward-sloping demand curve.

Example: The Restaurant Market

Why can your favorite restaurant charge a little more than the competition?

  • Location — convenience matters
  • Cuisine — not all food is the same
  • Atmosphere — ambiance, service, brand
  • Quality — some restaurants are just better

Each of these creates differentiation — making the restaurant an imperfect substitute for its competitors.

Monopolistic Competition: Short Run

Figure 5: Short run: the firm earns positive economic profit

Monopolistic Competition: Long Run Entry

Profits attract entry of close substitutes:

  1. New firms enter with similar (but differentiated) products
  2. Customers spread across more firms
  3. Each firm’s demand shifts left (and becomes more elastic)
  4. Entry continues until \(P = ATC\) \(\rightarrow\) zero economic profit

Entry works because new firms offer close substitutes — they steal customers even though products aren’t identical.

Monopolistic Competition: Long Run Equilibrium

Figure 6: Entry shifts demand left until P = ATC — zero economic profit

The Variety Tradeoff

Even in the long run, monopolistic competition has two “inefficiencies”:

  1. Markup: \(P > MC\) — allocative inefficiency
  2. Excess capacity: firms produce left of minimum ATC

But is this really bad?

  • Consumers get variety — different restaurants, styles, brands
  • The “cost” is slightly higher prices than perfect competition

The markup is the price we pay for choice.

Oligopoly: Few Firms, Partial Substitutes

Key features:

  • Few firms dominate the market
  • Products are partial substitutes (similar but not identical)
  • High barriers to entry
  • Firms are strategically aware of each other

Examples: airlines, smartphone OS (iOS/Android), OPEC, auto manufacturers

Oligopoly: The Cartel Temptation

Oligopolists face a prisoner’s dilemma:

Firm B: High Price Firm B: Low Price
Firm A: High Price Both profit A loses, B gains
Firm A: Low Price A gains, B loses Both low profit
  • Collude (both high price) \(\rightarrow\) maximize joint profit
  • Cheat (undercut) \(\rightarrow\) steal customers because products are substitutes
  • Nash equilibrium \(\rightarrow\) both cheat, both worse off

Oligopoly: Real-World Examples

Airlines:

  • Few carriers on most routes (partial substitutes)
  • Frequent price matching, occasional price wars

OPEC:

  • Agreement to restrict oil output
  • Members constantly tempted to cheat

Smartphones:

  • iOS and Android — only two real options
  • Network effects raise barriers to entry

Game 1: Price War (Prisoner’s Dilemma)

  • You and one other firm each pick a price simultaneously
    • High price = collude (maximize joint profit)
    • Low price = undercut (steal customers)
  • No communication allowed

Your goal: maximize your own profit.

Key ideas: - “High” = cartel price; “Low” = cheating - What you choose depends on expectations about the rival

Payoff Matrix

  • Both pick High: both earn high profit
  • One picks Low, one High: low-price firm gains, high-price firm loses
  • Both pick Low: profits shrink (“price war”)
  • Firm B: High Price Firm B: Low Price
    Firm A: High Price A: 1, B: 1 A: 0, B: 2
    Firm A: Low Price A: 2, B: 0 A: 0.5, B: 0.5

Prediction: Even though (High, High) is best together, (Low, Low) is the one-shot equilibrium (“dominant strategy”: Low protects you no matter what).

How We’ll Play

  1. Log in to the app
  2. Pick High or Low
  3. Submit (choices hidden)
  4. I’ll close the round and reveal the results
  5. You receive flex passes equal to the profit you earned

We’ll repeat across multiple rounds—watch for how strategies evolve.

What to Observe

  • Can we sustain collusion (High/High) for more than one round?
  • What happens after a “cheat”?
  • Do players retaliate (“punish”)?
  • Does trust rebuild?

Debrief: Why Cartels Collapse

  • Group vs self-interest: individual incentives undercut the collective
  • Trust is fragile: one defection unravels cooperation
  • Hard to monitor: hard to punish cheaters if you can’t observe them
  • Repeated interaction: only hope for sustaining collusion is the threat of future punishment

This sets up the move to theory: Nash equilibrium, repeated games, and antitrust policy.

Comparison: All Four Market Structures

Feature Perfect Comp. Monopolistic Comp. Oligopoly Monopoly
Substitutability Perfect Close Partial None
\(P\) vs \(MC\) \(P = MC\) \(P > MC\) \(P > MC\) \(P > MC\)
Long-run profit Zero Zero Positive Positive
Efficient? Yes No No No
Entry Free Free Restricted Blocked
Variety None High Some None

The common thread: less substitutability \(\rightarrow\) more market power \(\rightarrow\) greater departure from efficiency.

Closing Question

Is some inefficiency worth it if consumers value variety?

Would you prefer:

  • One identical restaurant at \(P = MC\) pricing?
  • Many differentiated restaurants at markup pricing?

Think about this as we move to price discrimination and antitrust policy next.