Tax/economic Incidence

Wojciech Kopczuk, adapted by Kyle Coombs

Vassar College

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In the news: who pays for tariffs?

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- His administration insists foreign producers pay the tariffs.
- Critics insist U.S. consumers and producers pay the tariffs.

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- Critics insist U.S. consumers and producers pay the tariffs.
- What do you need to know to make an educated guess?
- How can we estimate incidence?

Learning goals

- Differentiate statutory from economic tax incidence
- Oerive formula for tax incidence in partial equilibrium
- Second to the second to the

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Who bears its cost? Who benefits? There are potential implications for many parties involved.

buyers of SUVs

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- buyers of other cars
- car manufacturers
- producers of gasoline and other types of cars
- workers and shareholders of all these companies
- suppliers of all these companies


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- **Economic incidence**: how much parties pay relative to tax-free equilibrium


Tax incidence in partial equilibrium



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- **Economic incidence**: how much parties pay relative to tax-free equilibrium
- Statutory is irrelevant in standard models

Shifting the tax to the other side



Consider a \$10 tax on mugs. D(p) = 130 - 2.5p, S(p) = 5 + 2.5p.

Without taxes: $130 - 2.5p = 5 + 2.5p \Rightarrow p = 25$

Different tax schemes (t_C and t_P):

• Buyers pay $t_C = 10$

② Sellers pay $t_P = 10$

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Tax on consumers, different markets

Tax on consumers, but supply/demand change.

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
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
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$$D(p) = 130 - 4p$$
, $S(p) = 5 + p$, $t_C = 10$
sellers: $p(t_C) = 17$
buyers: $p(t_C) + t_C = 27$ \Rightarrow Sellers: 80%, buyers: 20%

For more examples, try out:

https://demonstrations.wolfram.com/TaxIncidence/





• Tax incidence depends on the slopes of demand and supply.

²Note: this is for sellers' price. For buyers, it is: $\frac{S'(p)}{S'(p)-D'(p+1)} \leftarrow \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$

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• The slopes are the derivatives D' and S', so...²

$$D'(p+t)\cdot (\frac{\partial p}{\partial t}+1) = S'(p)\cdot \frac{\partial p}{\partial t} \Rightarrow \frac{\partial p}{\partial t} = \frac{D'(p+t)}{S'(p)-D'(p+t)}$$

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• But slopes could change... is there a better formula?

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Incidence: From slopes to elasticities

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- In equilibrium, D(p + t) = S(p)
- $D'(p+t) = \frac{\partial D}{\partial p}$, $S'(p) = \frac{\partial S}{\partial p}$ (definition of derivative)

$$\frac{\partial p}{\partial t} = \frac{D'(p+t)}{(S'(p) - D'(p+t))} \cdot \frac{\frac{p}{S(p)}}{\frac{p}{S(p)}} = \frac{\frac{\partial D}{\partial p} \cdot \frac{p}{D(p+t)}}{\frac{\partial S}{\partial p} \cdot \frac{p}{S(p)} - \frac{\partial D}{\partial p} \cdot \frac{p}{D(p+t)}}$$

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So that

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Abuse of notation to simplify expression: ε_D defined as $D'(p+t)\frac{p}{D(p+t)}$ rather than $D'(p+t)\frac{p+t}{D(p+t)}$



Special cases

Denoting p_C is the price paid by consumers, p is the price paid by producers, and t is the tax:

• vertical (inelastic) demand (smoking?) $D'(p) = \varepsilon_p^D = 0, \ \frac{\partial p}{\partial t} = 0, \ p_C'(t) = 1$

What kind of demand elasticity is this?



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- horizontal (elastic) demand (yellow M&Ms) $D'(p) = \varepsilon_p^D = \infty$, $\frac{\partial p}{\partial t} = -1$, $p'_C(t) = 0$
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• vertical (inelastic) supply (labor in the short term?, land?) $S'(p) = \varepsilon_p^S = 0$, $\frac{\partial p}{\partial t} = -1$, $p'_C(t) = 0$



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- Partial equilibrium: study one market (e.g. Just SUVs)
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- His administration insists foreign producers pay the tariffs.
- Critics insist U.S. consumers and producers pay the tariffs.
- What do you need to know to make an educated guess?
 Elasticities (we use theory!)
- How can we estimate incidence? Causal inference tools (diff-in-diff, IV, shift-share, etc.)

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- Of course, statutory incidence may matter for other reasons:
 - Imperfect tax compliance
 - Price frictions
 - Tax misperceptions
 - Other markets (general equilibrium)



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
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- Demand: $D(p, p^2) = (a + c \cdot p^S) b \cdot p$, where p^s is the price of a substitute
- Supply: $S(p) = d \cdot p$




General equilibrium incidence: What about other cars?



Less demand for SUVs due to tax. Eq: $O \rightarrow A$




General equilibrium incidence



- 1 Demand for other cars up, raising their price (not pictured).
- ② SUV Demand up when substitutes more expensive. $A \rightarrow B$

General equilibrium incidence



Gen eq. incidence $O \to B$ smaller than partial equilibrium $O \to A$ – tax burden shifts from SUV market to other car markets.

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- Demand: $D(p, p^2) = (a + c \cdot p^S) b \cdot p$, where p^s is the price of a substitute
- Supply: $S(p) = d \cdot p$
- The same thing will be happening in the other market; we should analyze both of them at the same time.



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


Figure: Tariff rates and relative import prices in 2018. (Source: Amiti et al. (2019))

Table 1
Impact of US Tariffs on Importing

| | $ \frac{ log\ change}{foreign\ exporter} \\ \frac{prices}{(1)} \\ \hline \Delta ln\ (p_{ijt}) $ | $log\ change$ $import$ $quantities$ (2) $\Delta ln(m_{ijt})$ | $log\ change$ $import$ $quantities$ (3) $\Delta ln(m_{ijt})$ | $\begin{array}{c} log\ change\\ import\\ values\\ (4)\\ \hline \Delta ln\left(p_{ijl}{\times}m_{ijl}\right) \end{array}$ | $log\ change \\ import \\ values \\ (5) \\ \hline \Delta ln\left(p_{ijt} \times m_{ijt}\right)$ |
|---|---|--|--|--|---|
| | | | | | |
| log change tariff $\Delta \ln (1 + Tariff_{ijt})$ | -0.012 | -1.310*** | -5.890*** | -1.424*** | -6.364*** |
| | (0.023) | (0.090) | (0.590) | (0.086) | (0.773) |
| $N \\ R^2$ | 1,647,617 | 1,647,617 | 3,318,912 | 2,487,370 | 4,461,376 |
| | 0.021 | 0.024 | 0.099 | 0.012 | 0.102 |


Foreign exporters saw effectively no change in their prices, implying consumers bore the price increases. (Source: Amiti et al. (2019))

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- Kopczuk & Munroe (2015): discontinuous mansion tax in NJ and NY
 - 1% tax on sales of houses/apartments over \$1M
 - \$0 if the price is \$999,999 and \$1K when the price is \$1M.
 - Introduced in NJ in 2004.

Distribution of Taxable Sales in New Jersey



Final remarks

- Short-term and long-term incidence can be quite different.
 For example, the demand for gasoline is very inelastic in the short-run but may be elastic in the long-run.
- Examples of empirical work related to economic incidence:
 - Tax salience whether the tax is included in the price or presented separately seems to matter (Chetty, Looney and Kroft, American Economic Review, 2009)
 - The effect of EITC on wages result: \$1 increase, \$.23 decline in wages (Rothstein, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2010)
 - The effect of simultaneous Food Stamp payments on prices in local stores — not much (Hastings and Washington, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 2010)